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MORTGAGES
MORTGAGES -AGENCY- SALES- E-FFECT OF FLOOR PLAN
RULE ON COMPETING CHATTEL MORTGAGES
Young, a used car dealer, purchased a used automobile, financing
his purchase by executing a chattel mortgage thereon to the plaintiff,
which mortgage was duly recorded. Young represented to the plaintiff
that the car was to be for his own personal use, and the trial court found
as a fact that the plaintiff had no knowledge that the car was to be resold.
Shortly afterwards Young sold the car to Boster who made a down
payment and executed a chattel mortgage to Young to secure the unpaid
balance. On the same day, for a valuable consideration, Young assigned
the mortgage to the defendant, whereupon Young left for parts un-
known. When Boster learned of the plaintiff's prior mortgage, he
surrendered the car to the defendant, and the plaintiff now sues in
replevin to recover the car. The Court of Appeals held for the plaintiff,
estopping the defendant to set up the floor plan rule defense.
The Floor Plan Rule is a doctrine which estops the lienholder or the
conditional vendor of a dealer's merchandise to assert his claim against
an innocent third party, who is misled by the dealer's appearance of
ownership or of authority to sell. The doctrine is founded on the rules
of agency, relating to apparent ownership and apparent authority. When
dealing with the ability of a person to make a valid sale, it matters not
which of these appearances is created.2 Mere possesison of an encum-
bered chattel by a dealer in similar articles is sufficient in itself to justify
a reliance upon an apparent authority to sell.' Some additional indicia
of property are required for a reasonable reliance,' the amount varying
with the views of the court.' Since the floor plan defense is based on
an estoppel, arising from the misleading acts of the mortgagee in cloth-
ing the dealer with indicia of property, when the court found that the
plaintiff had no knowledge, actual or implied, that the car was to be sold,
the defendant's estoppel argument was refuted. Hence the rule that
the floor plan doctrine is no defense to a subsequent mortgagee where the
' Springfield Loan Co. v. National Guarantee and Finance Co., 63 Ohio App. Sos,
Z7 N.E. (2d.) 257 (1939).
2 MATHEWS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP
(1940) 205.8 Levi v. Booth, 58 Md. 305, 42 Am. Rep. 33z (188)2i Utica Trust and Deposit Co.
v. Decker, 244 N.Y. 340, i55 N.E. 665 (1927); WILLISTON O- SALES (2d ed. 1924)
sec. 314, p. 720.
'Levi v. Booth, note 3 supra. WILLISTON OH SALES (2d ed. 1924) sec. 385, p. 721.
1 Compare Utica Trust and Deposit Co. v. Decker, note 3 supra, with Boice v. Finance
and Guaranty Corporation, 827 Va. 563, ioz S.E. 591, xo A.L.R. 654 (1920).
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prior mortgagee lacked such knowledge. As the court in the principal
case admits, the defendant succeeded to all rights of Boster, the pur-
chaser, it is obvious that the same rule applies to a purchaser. Apparently
this court did not distinguish between a mortgagee and a purchaser of
the dealer, as did the Supreme Court in National Guarantee and Finance
Co. v. Pfaff Motor Car Co.,, where the court refused to apply the
Floor Plan Rule in favor of a mortgagee of the dealer, and indicated
that the doctrine is only invoked to protect purchasers. The principal
case at least leaves open the possibility of successful use of that defense,
where the subsequent mortgagee can prove the elements of estoppel.
The leading case asserting the floor plan doctrine, although using it in
that instance to protect a purchaser, indicates that similar protection
would be accorded a mortgagee of the dealer.' The first Ohio court
to recognize the rule appears to have adopted this view without reserva-
tion.' In Colonial Finance Co. v. McCrate' the Court of Appeals in
dicta based on the authority of the Pfaff case, ' said that the floor plan
rule was a doctrine to protect the ordinary purchaser, which under the
laws of Ohio includes a mortgagee of the dealer. The Uniform Sales
Act defines purchaser as including a mortgagee or pledgee. 1 In defense
of the distinction between subsequent purchasers and subsequent mort-
gagees of the dealer, one might suggest as did the court in the principal
case," that being accustomed to mortgage transactions, the mortgagee
should be aware of the existence as well as the purpose of the Chattel
Mortgage Recording Act." Especially is this true where the defendant,
as here, is a Finance Company. Yet, the floor plan rule is designed
to cushion the effect of strict adherence to the fiction of constructive
notice. In short, it is an exception to the recording act. Viewed in this
light and remembering that the recording act refers to both subsequent
purchasers and mortgagees, one wonders whether the above argument
is sufficiently strong to support the distinction. In summary the principal
case serves a tvofold purpose, for it eliminates the floor plan rule in one
fact situation, yet by the limitation of its rule leaves open a pathway
"7 24 Ohio St. 34, 176 N.E. 678 (193).
7 Boice v. Finance and Guaranty Corporation, note 5 supra.
'Hostetler v. National Acceptance Co., 36 Ohio App. 141, 17z N.E. Sp (1930).
For bitory of the Floor Plan Rule in Ohio, see Note (i939) 5 OHIO STATZ L. J. 422.
"6o Ohio App. 68, 76, x9 N.E. (1938). See Note (1939) 5 Onto STATE L. J. 422;
jc alo, Note (1939) x6 Ohio Op. 103.
"'National Guarantee and Finance Co. v. Pfaff Motor Car Co., supra, note 6.
"' OHIo G.C. sec. 8456.
"' Springfield Loan Co. v. National Guarantee and Finance Co., note I supra.
7' OHxo G.C. sec. S56o Ct seq. See also Conditional Sales Act, OHIO G.C. sec. 8568
Ci sc.
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to the breakdown of a questionable distinction between subsequent pur-
chasers and mortgagees.
It is noteworthy that the facts of the principal case arose before the
Certificate of Title Act became effective."4 This act would preclude
the problem of the principal case by providing title registration and
a recordation of encumbrances on the certificate of tide, thus facilitating
actual notice. But the act is narrow in its scope, referring only to
motor vehicles, leaving the problem discussed above still alive with respect
to other chattels.
J.P.M.
TORTS
NEGLIGENCE- DUTY OF PLAINTIFF- PROXIMATE CAUSE
Plaintiff brought an action against the Board of County Commis-
sioners for the destruction of her home by fire. Liability was predicated
upon a statute which made the commissioners liable in their official
capacity for damages, caused by their negligence, in not keeping roads
or bridges in repair.1 The commissioners had allowed a ditch to remain
open across a county road, making it impossible for the apparatus of the
fire department to reach the scene of the fire, and prevent the subsequent
damage. On these facts, the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County
held that the defendants were not liable, because the plaintiff was not
included within the class of persons protected by statute, and because
the blockade of the road was not the proximate cause of the loss.2
It is often said in negligence actions, that to enable the plaintiff to
maintain an action, he must show that the defendant owed him a duty
of reasonable care, and that such a duty is owing to the plaintiff, if and
only if, the defendant should anticipate that some one in the position of
the plaintiff might be hurt, if the defendant did not use reasonable care.
A leading case announcing this doctrine is Palsgraff v. Long Island
Railroad Co.3 In that case the plaintiff was denied recovery for being
injured by a set of scales, falling from overhead as a result of an explosion
of a package of fire crackers some distance away, which were knocked
" Onto G.C. sec. 6z90-i to -z2, Effective Jan. 1, 1938. This act is not retroactivei
see OHio G.C. sec. 6290-9.
' OHio G.C. sec. 6z9o-4 and -9. By provision in Oaso G.C. sec. 629o-9 the Chattel
Mortgage Recording Act, cited note 13 supra, shall never apply to motor vehicles.
' OHio G.C. sec. 2408. The board (of county commissioners) shall be liable in its
official capacity for damages received by reason of its negligence or carelessness in not
keeping any such road or bridge (public, state or county) in proper repair.
2 Sheley v. Swing, 65 Ohio App. io9, z9 N.E. (zd) 364. (1939).
a248 N.Y. 339, 16z N.E. 99 (I928).
